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After a lengthy exposition concerning what he considers the dogmatism and
lack of critical attitude in traditional religion, O'Hear wraps up his discussion
by saying "My thesis in this chapter has been that religion is essentially dogmatic,
fetishistic, and authoritarian; that this aspect of religion is what religion derives
its strength from" (249), by, as he has suggested, pandering to the emotional
and psychological needs of people. And, not to miss a way of dismissing religion,
he adds to his characterization of it as rationally indefensible the claim that in
addition "religion (at least in any traditional form) cannot be a force for good
at the present" (244), a claim which has in this book just as little argumentative
support.

Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. by Steven T. Katz. Oxford University
Press, 1983.
Reviewed by NELSON PIKE, University of California, Irvine.
Professor Katz begins the "Editor's Introduction" to this text with a sketch of
what he calls "the predominant scholarly view" concerning the relation between
the mystic of a given culture and "the socio-historical, Philosophical-theological"
environment provided by the culture in question. According to this view, the
mystic is one who has something called "the mystical experience" and who then
"soars above dogma and community, leaving the sober majority behind to its
mechanical, if irrelevant, religious teachings and practices". The mystic's contact
with the religious community of which he is a part comes only at the point where
he " ... must descend from his height and then, caught up again in the fetters of
tradition and history, space and time, he must express what is truly inexpressible
in the inadequate symbols and syntax of his particular faith community". Given
this "common image" (what Katz calls "the "regnant scholarly orthodoxy"), the
question arises as to whether it may not be in error. And (Katz tell us) it is this
possibility-the possibility that it may be fundamentally mistaken-that (in his
words) "has brought the present symposium into being". Speaking ofthe relation
between the mystic and cultural milieu in which the mystic exists, Katz identifies
the issue to which the ten essays contained in this volume are (presumably)
addressed as follows:
The essays in this volume have been written in order to reconsider
this relational issue afresh with the hope that a more adequate schematization of this dialectical encounter can be arrived at. This is to say, the
present essays are attempts to reconsider, in various ways, the question:
"What relation(s) does obtain between mystics and the religious com-
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munities out of which they emerge and of which they are a part?"

However, Katz then goes on to say that the question with which this passage
ends can be framed more concretely so: .
Does Christian mysticism represent a universal religious experience
or is it necessarily related to Christian dogma, especially in its christological character? In other words, can one be a Christian mystic if one
denies classical christological claims? Is Nirvana attainable without subscribing to the Buddist teaching of no-self? Can Enlightenment be won
without holding to the Buddist doctrine of impermanence?
Katz adds that the advantage of formulating the generative question of the symposium in this second, more concrete way, is that it. ..
.. .helps bring to the surface the essential concern involved in discussing
the relationship of mystic to established religious communities, to wit:
do Muslims have essentially pre-formed Muslim experiences, Jews specially Jewish experiences, Christians christological experiences, Buddists
Buddist Enlightenment experiences and so on. And if so what does it
mean?
Those familiar with Katz' first collection of essays on mysticism (viz., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, London, 1978), will recall that in his own
contribution to that volume (an essay entitled "Language, Epistemology and
Mysticism"), Katz spent considerable time arguing against a view that he claimed
to find in the writings of R. C. Zaehner as well as in the work of Walter Stace
and Ninian Smart. According to the view in question, there are, at best, a few
limited kinds of mystical experiences; mysticism generally (cross-culturally) is
based on experiences of these sorts; and, thirdly, though the experiences had by
mystics of all cultures are basically the same, mystics interpret their mystical
experiences in accordance with the doctrines peculiar to their respective religious
traditions. What mystics experience is the same; what mystics believe and thus
say they have experienced differs according to extra-mystical religious convictions. Katz argued that this is not right. What the mystics experience is, in part,
determined by his pre-mystical beliefs. The experiences, themselves, are thus
(as he put it) "pre-figured" by theological convictions. There are thus as many
kinds of mystical experiences as there are kinds of pre-figuring belief-patterns;
Christians have Christian experiences, Jews have Jewish experiences, etc. Of
course, this is the thesis-form of the idea posed in question-form at the end of
the last paragraph. The question articulating what Katz refers to as the "essential
concern" of the present volume is precisely the one he supposes himself to have
already answered affirmatively in the 1978 paper. Thus, assuming (as I think
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Katz is) that the views of Zaehner, Stace and Smart can be taken as "the regnant
scholarly orthodoxy" in the area of comparative mysticism, the description in
the "Editor's Introduction" of the present volume would lead us to suppose that
the essays included will all be devoted to probing the thesis advanced by Katz
in his earlier paper.
It turns out, however, that of the ten papers contained in this volume, only
five have any real connection with the announced topic. In order of their appearance in the text, the five in question are: (1) Katz' own contribution-a paper
entitled "The 'Conservative' Character of Mysticism", (2) a paper by Robert
Gimello called "Mysticism in its Contexts", (3) "The Mystical Illusion" by Hans
Penner, (4) a study by Annemarie Schimmel entitled "Sufism and the Islamic
Tradition", and (5) an essay called "Experience and Dogma in the English
Mystics" by H. P. Owen. Let me say that while all five of these papers are
intelligently presented and of more or less substance, the one by Professor
Gimello seems to me to be of special interest. Unlike some of the others,
Gimello's essay is nicely focused-a steady and penetrating analysis of data
connected with what he refers to as "the Buddist master-concept of 'selflessness' ". His claim is that this concept is (as he says) "formative" not only of
Buddist mystical practices (including linguistic practices) but of Buddist mystical
experiences as well. Of course, whether (and if so to what extent) this Katz-like
thesis can be generalized is another matter. I (for one) am glad that Gimello did
not dwell too long on tliis second question. What makes his essay valuable is
not that it supports (if it does) some general speculative thesis about mysticism
as such, but that it makes close and meaningful contact with a really interesting
piece of the actual mystical literature.
As regards the remaining five essays in the collection, they range over a mix
of topics. Ninian Smart's paper on the via negativa and allied items is a well
focused, well reasoned and genuinely interesting piece. Smart's maturity as a
thinker is well displayed. His comments on the notion of ineffability seem to
me to be especially insightful. Then, too, there is a study by Julia Ching on the
use of the (so called) "mirror symbol" in Confucian and Taoist mysticism. This
paper is small of scope but particularly well executed. In my opinion, however,
the most important paper in this group----for that matter, the most impressive
paper in the collection as a whole- is the essay by Ewert Cousins entitled
"Francis of Assisi: Christian Mysticism at the Crossroads". This is a large and
ambitious study of the mysticism of St. Francis and its theological interpretation
in the writings of Bonaventura. In the course of the discussion the reader is
treated to a host of well centered though broadly ranging historical observations
and theological reflections that reveal their author to be a man of unusual depth.
This piece belongs on the "must read" list for anyone seriously interested in the
study of Christian mysticism.
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On the whole, I think that Katz' second volume of essays on mysticism, is a
success. If there is to be a third, I would suggest that Katz continue to solicit
papers such as those of Gimello and Cousins-papers that really show us, rather
than only tell us, how the mystical literature should be understood.

Creative Interchange, ed. by John A. Broyer and William S. Minor.
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.
566 pages. $27.50.
Reviewed by STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS, University of Texas at Austin.
This Festschrift in memory of Henry Nelson Wiemann, 1884-1975, shows
above all Wiemann's influence upon contemporary theology and religious
inquiry. The contributions range in topic from Wiemann's biography through
philosophic and social dimensions of his thought to aesthetics and comparative
religion.
The biographical contributions present Wiemann as a philosophic mystic who
is certain of the reality of "God," and who throughout his life strives to find
concepts adequate to his religious experience. Lewis Hahn's essay emphasizes
the change and development in Wiemann's thought in regard to the content of
his concept of God, as he reflected upon the nature of mystical experience.
Many contributors point out that Wiemann understands the term 'God' to
designate the source of human value. This Wiemann's "formal" definition of
the term apparently derives from his understanding of the relevant intellectual
history. It remains a fixed point in all the theological reformulations.
Marvin Shaw discerns another constant. This is that Wiemann sees mystical
experience not as supernaturalistic, but rather as a special dimension of ordinary
experience which compels personal growth. Often Wiemann identifies personal
growth as the "human good." Gary Kessler stresses that mystical or religious
experience, according to Wiemann, brings a person to transcend inherited dispositions of belief and behavior.
Echoing the vitalism of Bergson and the phenomenology of Husserl, Wiemann
later in his life found "creative interchange" to be the least inadequate way to
conceptualize the source of human good. (That he expresses his views in this
manner, as converging on theoretical adequacy asymptotically, is another indication of Wiemann's empiricism-many contributers see the empiricism as the
most prominent feature of his theology.) Michael Lazarin shows that the precursors of "creative interchange" extend to Plato's concept of eros in the Symposium
as well as to Socratic elenchus.
In enunciating the importance of creative interchange, Wiemann comes to

